# Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocation: the role of party preferences

Zachary D. Greene, Ph.D.
Chancellor's Fellow
Government and Public Policy Department
University of Strathclyde
zachary.greene@strath.ac.uk

Amanda A. Licht, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Binghamton University

Abstract
Resources for foreign aid come under attack when parties that care little for international affairs come to power. Internationally focused parties of the left and right, however, prefer to use aid as a tool to pursue their foreign policy goals. Yet varying goals based on left-right ideology differentiate the way donors use foreign aid. We leverage sector aid to test hypotheses from our Partisan Theory of Aid Allocation and find support for the idea that domestic political preferences affect foreign aid behavior. Left-internationalist governments increase disaster aid, while parochial counterparts cut spending on budget assistance and aid that bolsters recipients' trade viability. Conservative governments favor trade-boosting aid. We find consistent, nuanced, evidence for our perspective from a series of Error Correction Models and extensive robustness checks. By connecting theories of foreign aid to domestic politics, our approach links prominent, but often disconnected, fields of political research and raises important questions for policymakers interested in furthering the efficacy of development aid.

Keywords: foreign aid allocation, donor ideology, internationalism, sectoral aid, domestic politics, OECD donor states, party politics, multi-dimensional preferences

Foreign aid offers a potent instrument to incentivize recipient leaders' behavior, but its effectiveness has long been questioned.[1] For many scholars, aid's patchy record in promoting democratization, growth, and cooperation stems from moral hazard and geopolitics: donors' strategic incentives diverted aid flows from the neediest or most deserving states and damaged their credibility. Analysis focused on which donor-states fell into this trap (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004), and on aid's expanded utility after the Cold War (Bearce and Tirone 2010). New

[1] For a typology of "returns" to donor states, see Dudley and Montmarquette (1976). Morgenthau's (1962) essay exemplifies aid-for-policy skepticism.

research, however, seeks to explain variation in aid efforts *within countries* over time. These studies open up the democratic donor state, substituting the domestic political preferences of governments for the amorphous "national interest", but find mixed support thus far (e.g. Noël and Therién 1995; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Schmaljohann 2014). Yet, foreign aid allocations likely reflect the goals of domestic decision-makers and consequently the preferences of key actors should influence foreign aid outputs (Tingley 2010, Milner and Tingley 2010, Fleck and Kilby 2010, Dreher, et al. 2014).

We consider how partisan ideological preferences affect donors' allocation decisions across the array of foreign assistance sectors. We argue that parties' preferences predict their approach to foreign affairs. Changes in the preferences of governing parties produce shifts in allocation across aid types. Focusing on the effect of ideology on the most frequently used aid sectors allows detailed predictions that would be obscured by aggregate trends.[2] Our perspective dovetails with studies of party politics and public policy, where scholars recognize that policies and budgets reflect political processes (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Bevan and Greene 2015; Whitten and Williams 2011). Elections and coalition negotiations create governments with varying preferences over multiple dimensions of politics (Laver and Shepsle 1996).

Our theory relaxes strong assumptions about traditional left-right ideology by introducing a second dimension: internationalism. This dimension captures governments' preferences for engaging and influencing foreign countries relative to isolationism. This dimension has become increasingly salient in donors' domestic politics. Internationalism varies across parties with otherwise similar ideology and within parties over time. Donald Trump's views on aid and trade, for example, strongly contrast those of the 2012 Republican

[2] Theorizing at the aggregate level opens researchers up to ecological fallacy if meaningful sectoral differences based on donors' left-right preferences exist.

Party candidate, Mitt Romney (The New York Times 2012, Thoma 2016).[3] The absence of this dimension from prior work may partially explain inconsistent results across analyses using left-right dichotomies and aggregate aid flows (e.g. Noël and Therién 1995; Fleck and Kilby 2010, Dreher, et al. 2014).

Adding internationalism allows us to identify preferences of four ideal-types of parties: left-pro-international, left-anti-international, right-pro-international, and right-anti-international. We predict that internationalist governments likely use foreign aid as a tool of influence. Subsequent changes in aid allocations will reflect variation in preferences, as governments choose types of recipients and aid channels. Thus, we derive predictions regarding aid provision across stated purposes.[4] For example, a country can target aid to civil society or economic sectors depending on their left-right preferences for policy.

We test hypotheses from the Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid Allocation with data on parties' priorities for foreign aid from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), government composition from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2012), and aid allotments from AidData (Tierney, et al. 2011). Analysis of 28 donor countries over nearly 40 years supports an explanation that incorporates ideological preferences. Internationalist governments pursue economic agendas through aid allocations that reflect their partisan preferences. We submit our results to a wide range of robustness checks, including alternate modeling and measurement strategies in the online appendix.

[3] Successive Republican Party Platforms shifted language about aid. Initially, they "call[ed] for the development of a strategy for foreign assistance that serves our national interest…strengthen[s] the non-military tools to further our national security goals…" (2008). In 2012, the party proposed "[l]imiting foreign aid spending helps keep taxes lower, which frees more resources in the private and charitable sectors, whose giving tends to be more effective and efficient". The tone changed again in 2016; "[f]oreign assistance programs must not only project the best of American values, but must work to create self-sustainability and leverage the resources and capacity of the private sector."

[4] Pursued elsewhere, our theory also suggests variation recipient type.

This study holds implications for theories of political development, foreign influence, partisan politics, and democratic accountability. Our theory suggests an additional explanation for aid's failure to induce behavior from recipient states. This lack of success partially reflects aid's politicized nature and the conditions under which it is given. The donor credibility problem, here, stems from domestic political competition rather than the global balance of power. The timing, amount, and nature of aid allocated should not depend on the politics of the donor country, lest recipients perceive funds as tools of political manipulation.

Furthermore, theories of representative democracy require representatives to pursue campaign statements. Studies often find weak evidence of partisan priorities affecting policy change (e.g. Bevan, John and Jennings 2011). Our findings, however, suggest parties pursue their stated goals. Previous research may miss nuanced effects of preferences on foreign policy, as we find that short- and long-term effects may differ. Moreover, foreign aid's effect on goals such as democracy promotion and developing foreign markets for trade manifest over time. More broadly, evidence suggests partisan governments pursue priorities consistent with their electoral statements, even in the realm of foreign policy.

**Preferences and Government Policy**

Scholars link parties' ideology to government behavior. Research predicts budgets and policy via either the goals of parties' supporters or statements from their campaigns (Hibbs 1977). While much research emphasizes competition on the traditional left-right economic dimension of politics, parties stake out independent positions on a diversity of issues, including the environment, immigration, and foreign intervention (Lowe, et al. 2011, de Vries and Hobolt 2012). Domestic electoral competition forces governments to outline preferences on diverse issues, while incentivizing a reputation of accountability for their statements.

Parties balance their sincere preferences against office-seeking goals (Strøm 1990). Electoral competition encourages parties to shift preferences in response to public opinion

(Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009), issue-focused parties' success (Meguid 2008), competitors' policy changes, and economic conditions (Williams, Seki and Whitten 2016). Voters' responses to these shifts, however, are often delayed (Somer-Topcu 2009).

Electoral and intra-party motives drive party manifesto content. Parties select issues because of historically positive associations (Petrocik 1996, Egan 2013), or to match traditional supporters' preferences (Hibbs 1977). Ideologically extreme and governing parties incorporate new topics (de Vries and Hobolt 2012, Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013). Parties emphasize topics to appear responsive (Sigelman and Buell 2004, Spoon and Klüver 2014). Past government experience, economic conditions and the diversity of their parliamentary delegation and leadership all influence the breadth of issues in parties' campaigns (Greene 2016, Greene and O'Brien 2016).

Varied motives drive parties to address topics beyond the traditional left-right cleavage, such as foreign policy. The electoral context encourages parties to focus on economic foreign policy, or broader goals (e.g. Hellwig 2012; Greene 2016; Williams et al. 2016). Distinguishing preferences on such issues from those on the economic dimension allows researchers to account for the complexity of party competition and policy change inside democracies.

Upon entering office, parties pursue policy consistent with electoral statements to maintain a positive reputation. Research connecting electoral statements to behavior in government describes a complex linkage between parties' goals and policy-making behaviors. For example, parties campaign on and formulate budgets emphasizing the goals of their primary electoral constituencies (Hibbs 1977). Even in the context of coalition or divided government, parties fulfill many electoral pledges (Thomson 2001, 2011), and pursue policies and budgets consistent with their goals (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Schmidt 1996). Parties pursue control of cabinet positions and engage in oversight of ideologically distant ministers on their issue priorities (Bäck, Debus and Dumont 2011, Greene and Jensen 2016). Parties'

may face substantial hurdles to implementing their policy priorities, but dedicate resources consistent with their electoral appeals nonetheless (Tsebelis 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Further, their responses to changing events depend on their policy priorities (Bevan and Greene 2016, 2017).

Research on competition and accountability suggests that parties hold distinct preferences across diverse issues. They pursue policy in line with these statements in parliament and through budgetary decisions. Building on this approach, we propose the Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid Allocation, incorporating multi-dimensional policy preferences and varying foreign aid types.

**A Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid Allocation**

Foreign aid transfers capital from rich to poor states. Governments use aid to achieve outcomes. Donor goals vary from geostrategic coalition-building, to pursuit of new markets for imports. Generous-mindedness is possible, too; the desired outcome may be "… some indication that they [donors] have had a favorable impact on the residents of the recipient country" (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976, 133).

Donors' goals drive patterns of aid allocation. If economic goals predominate, then trade partners likely to import goods from the donor should receive more aid. If geopolitical strategy drives donors, then alliance partners, those near to rivals, or possessed of valuable natural resources should garner a larger share of aid flows. If a desire to improve recipients' lives propels policy, then governments most in need of and most likely to properly utilize additional resources should see more aid. The empirical literature supports these arguments, though many lament the relative power of trade and geopolitical incentives over humanitarianism (Collier and Dollar 2002, Berthélemy and Tichit 2004, Berthélemy 2006, Stone 2006, Fuchs, Nunnenkamp and Öhler 2015). Milner and Tingley (2010) find

particularly strong support for the role of economic incentives in American legislators' preferences, tracing their votes on forms of aid to their districts' resource endowments.

Much of this literature, however, examines cross-donor variation in aid allocation (e.g. Dietrich 2016). To explain changes in aid distribution *within* donors, scholars examine ruling parties' ideologies. Many draw a parallel between domestic preference for redistribution and willingness to transfer wealth to less developed countries (Noël and Therién 1995, Therién and Noël 2000, Tingley 2010). Findings regarding the relative generosity of leftist (or social-democratic) parties vary across sample and method of estimation (Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp 2014). Sometimes leftist parties appear more generous (Tingley 2010); other times conservative governments allocate more (Goldstein and Moss 2005, Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Schmaljohann 2015). Some evidence suggests rather, that liberal and conservative actors send aid for different reasons (Milner and Tingley 2010, Fleck and Kilby 2006, 2010, Brech and Potrafke 2014).

We contribute to this emerging literature, linking ideology to foreign aid preferences. Parties' policy goals play an important role in the formulation of foreign aid programs. Considering parties' preferences for foreign involvement explains variance in donor behavior. The effect of parties' preferences is more complex than previously suggested; the relative strength of actors' ideologies and desire to become internationally engaged imply varying affinity for types of foreign aid that serve different political goals (e.g. humanitarian versus budget aid). Incorporating preferences over foreign intervention and sectoral aid will explain previously inconclusive evidence for left-right allocation patterns.

Previous scholarship equates domestic preferences for redistribution of wealth (leftist ideology) with willingness to redistribute wealth internationally (Noël and Therién 1995; Therién and Noël 2000). While we agree that leftist economic ideology affects donor preferences over foreign aid, we also believe this assumption ignores variation in the rationale behind aid. One need not believe in economic and social justice to see foreign aid as a useful

policy tool, particularly for aid allocated to sectors such as budget support or trade factors. Conservative governments have plenty of reasons to support foreign aid: economic growth promotes the development of new markets for a country's products and services; contributing to international efforts earns the state more influence in IOs; charity creates a favorable reputation that appeals to conservative social values.

We propose that attitudes towards foreign affairs or, internationalism, constitute an important factor in models of donor behavior. Parties of both the left and right may see foreign aid as an expedient tool to pursue policy goals abroad, depending on their preferences for engaging with the wider world. Part of aid's expedience, however, stems from the different goals it can be tailored to serve.

Incorporating economic ideology with internationalism produces four ideal party types: left-pro-international, right-pro-international, left-anti-international, and right-anti-international. Left-right ideology encapsulates preferences relevant for predicting variance in sectoral aid allocations. Although often initially defined by its emergence from class conflicts (e.g. labor versus capital groups; Lipset and Rokkan 1960), left-right ideology also contains and organizes disagreements on a range of topics such as social, morality or education policies. The exact content of the left-right dimension differs across contexts, but generally reflects broadly prescribed responses to social, economic and political inequality (e.g. (Mair 2007). Left-leaning positions emphasize the role of governments in decreasing economic inequality; more rightist positions tolerate inequality in the name of economic development and market liberalization (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Bakker, Jolly and Polk 2012). While most associate the left-right dimension with economic conflict, "attitudes to gender, to the police, to the international order…form an intrinsic element of that dimension" (Mair 2007, 215; see also (Budge and Robertson 1987). Overall, preferences for economic, gender, social and political equality will lead leftist governments to use aid types that reduce inequalities

abroad, while more conservative governments design aid packages for broad economic growth.

The internationalism dimension refers to preferences for engagement versus insularity. A pro-international party champions international organizations, looks to the international community for legitimacy, and seeks a greater role in international affairs. Consider the British Conservative party's 2010 declaration:

> Protecting Britain's enlightened national interest requires global engagement. We will be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world. Our national identity is bound up in our historic global role as an outward-looking nation, giving generously to developing countries, and providing a safe haven to genuine refugees (Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, 109).

An anti-international party emphasizes the costs of international entanglements, demanding greater focus on domestic matters and reduced obligations abroad. The Australian Liberal Party's Federal Platform, for example, offers this more guarded statement about global engagement: "Liberals recognise the growing influence of globalisation but guard the sovereignty of our nation" (Liberal Party of Australia 2015, 15). Indeed, the party's entire 2015 foreign policy statement contains less than 200 words.

Table 1 summarizes our conceptualization of the intersection between economic ideology and internationalism. Integrating these dimensions produces meaningful distinctions. The British Conservative Party's emphasis on international influence fits well with a rightist pro-international agenda, prioritizing diplomatic efforts to further Britain's "…culture, education, commerce and security." Labour's 2010 manifesto exemplifies a leftist pro-international party, emphasizing "[t]he global poverty emergency" and reforming international organizations to favor inclusiveness (Labour Party Manifesto 2010, 10.6).

Foreign policy statements can be prominent, such as Trump's recent calls for reducing foreign aid versus Clinton's appeals for greater international intervention (Thoma 2016). Upon entering office, parties seek to appear responsible and accountable. Even if foreign

policy is a secondary division, election campaigns often include strong reform pledges.[5] For example, the British Conservative party in 2010 included a foreign policy section which declared, "We will engage positively the world to deepen alliances and build new partnerships. We will reform international institutions, help those in need…." (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2010).

<<<Table 1 Here>>>

Manipulating aid allocations provides a relatively easy demonstration of commitment to foreign affairs.[6] The Conservative Party manifesto later explains that "…we should use this opportunity to reaffirm… our values – which is why we will continue to increase the level of British aid" (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2010). Aid can be used to further many goals; it is customizable. Donors manipulate not just how much aid their government sends, but to which countries, what purposes, and which recipient actors the funds accrue. The U.S. Republican Party platform of 2012 contains a potent example, directly contrasting its vision for the use of foreign aid with the incumbent democratic government's:

> The effectiveness of our foreign aid has been limited by the cultural agenda of the current Administration, attempting to impose on foreign countries… legalized abortion and the homosexual rights agenda. At the same time, faith-based groups—the sector that has had the best track record in promoting lasting development—have been excluded from grants because they will not conform to the administration's social agenda. We will reverse this tragic course, encourage more involvement by the most effective aid organizations, and trust developing peoples to build their future from the ground up (Republican National Committee 2012, 46).

Hence, we expect internationalist governments to adjust more than just the amount of aid. To align international assistance programs with their preferences, parties will also alter the goals that aid dollars serve. In practice, this means changing the *type* of foreign aid allocated.

[5] Parties often include statements that suggest strong preferences for international influence, distinct from economic principles.

[6] Several scholars assume speedy alteration of foreign aid allocations after governmental change (Tingley 2010, Fleck and Kilby 2006, Cox and Duffin 2008).

The Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid produces nuanced expectations regarding both the types of programs favored by donors and the recipients to which more funds will flow. Here, we develop the first set of expectations: how do pro-international governments of different ideology differ in the types of aid favored?[7] Table 2 summarizes our expectations.

If left pro-international parties favor economic justice and equality (e.g. Mair 2007), then they may choose to allocate more aid overall as argued by some in the literature. However, they may also attempt to allocate aid that reduces economic or social inequality (Fleck and Kilby 2006). We consider disaster assistance, here, as a metric of need. To tap the social-justice angle of leftist ideology, we consider aid to non-status quo actors.

Disaster and humanitarian assistance comprise a significant component of aid budgets. At first glance, stochastic events – earthquakes, drought, and disease outbreaks – determine this flow. Such processes drive much of the volatility in aid receipt (Hudson and Mosley 2008). Natural disasters provide a clear indicator of economic deprivation and need. Typically, NGOs on the ground administer humanitarian funds and supplies, limiting embezzlement by recipient states. This aid potently symbolizes a left-international government's support for reducing economic and social deprivation. Conversely, a left-international government that ignored international disasters may draw constituents' ire. This form of aid, therefore, fits particularly well with the goals ascribed to leftist governments.

Confronted with failure to promote democracy and growth, many donors seek to bypass recipient governments, by directly funding non-status quo groups.[8] Those concerned that dependence on foreign actors for revenue weakens "vertical accountability" in recipients, allowing the powerful to further enrich themselves at the expense of the poor (Boone 1996),

[7] Testing the second set of expectations requires an alternative data structure and empirical strategy. As such this is best pursued separately.

[8] Dietrich's (2016) work suggests type of political economy mediates the likelihood of bypass.

may prefer directly funding civil society and non-executive actors.[9] Sometimes called "democracy aid" (Scott and Steele 2011, Resnick 2012), these transfers include programs to establish and strengthen independent electoral commissions, increase voter registration and political participation, train and oversee police and legal processes, and promote human rights and race and gender equality. Pursuing these goals coordinates with leftist's preoccupation with political and social inequality by strengthening institutional frameworks that ensure representation in government (Therién and Noël 2000). Money sent through such channels may look more legitimate to leftist constituencies skeptical of democratizing governments and business interests.

This discussion produces the following testable expectations.

H1a: More leftist and internationalist governing parties will allocate more aid to *non-status quo* actors inside recipients.

H1b: More leftist and internationalist governing parties will allocate more resources to *disaster aid*.

Rightist internationally-minded parties should also use foreign aid liberally. However, their strategy differs substantively from pro-international left governments; preferences for economic growth, liberalized markets, traditional moral and social values, and overall greater tolerance for inequality motivate their choices (e.g. Mair 2007; Volkens et al. 2011). Consequently, we expect right-pro-international parties employ aid to cultivate new markets for capital-intensive exports (Milner and Tingley 2010, Fuchs, Nunnenkamp and Öhler 2015), curry favor with geopolitically relevant states (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009b, Kuziemko and Werker 2006), and gain influence over targeted leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009). These motives may produce equivalent

[9] An established branch of the literature posits that aid flows may be analogous to other "unearned income" (Smith 2008, Morrison 2009, Ahmed 2012, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2013). Recent work, however, questions this argument theoretically and empirically (Atlincekic and Bearce 2014)

aggregate aid spending across sectors that encourage liberalization and opening of foreign economies (with fewer protections for specific industries) and support more traditional social policies and dominant groups.[10]

Milner and Tingley (2010) find evidence of variation in preferences for aid allocation in the U.S. Congress based on the prevalence of heavy-capital industries across constituencies. At the national level, we expect rightist governments use aid to support export oriented businesses. Contrasting governments that emphasize reducing inequalities, rightist governments might funnel aid towards projects to increase the viability of recipient markets for goods. This can be partially accomplished by boosting the economic capacity of potential trade partners. A vast swathe of the purpose codes identified by the OECD and Aid Data suggest this motivation.

Rightist parties might also pursue "aid-for policy" deals (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Just as those concerned about the neediest within recipient countries eschew budget aid as potentially fungible and injurious to their purposes, donors looking to purchase influence may prize program support as the most effective tool (Resnick 2012; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008). Less preoccupied by economic inequality, rightist governments value budget aid's potential to induce reforms beneficial to donor capitol groups. Aid that helps recipients spend on what they choose and bolsters their trade ability has symbolic value. It signals donor support of recipient governments, easing future requests for favors relevant to economic, geopolitical or other goals.

We should, then, expect the following hypotheses to hold.

H2a: Government parties that are more rightist and internationalist will allocate more aid to *budget-support*.

[10] We do not believe, however, that left-international governments are saintly immune from geopolitical and economic interests. Rather, their ideology produces incentives which offset the utility of aid for more cynical or commercial purposes.

H2b: Governing parties that are more rightist and internationalist will allocate more aid to *trade support* (such as factor-production programs).

Given their ideological propensities, we expect left and right governments on the anti-international side not to increase aid allocations of any type. Inward-looking governments deprioritize influence over foreign countries in ways that are consistent with other aspects of their ideology. Our expectations, then, require that we allow internationalism to condition the effect of ideology on aid flows.

Altogether, we expect that relative differences in ideology produce prominent differences in governments'foreign aid distribution. Left-international governments allocate resources to aid that reduces economic, social and political inequalities, whereas more right-international governments use aid to develop market access and trading partners. Focusing only on the total amount of aid would muddle ideology's effect and produce inconsistent empirical findings across samples. Therefore, we focus our analysis on differences in foreign aid sectors.

<<<Table 2 Here>>>

**Data and Methods**

We construct a set of aid allocations for 28 donors from 1974 to 2010.[11] Using AidData 2.1 (Tierney, et al. 2011), we aggregate aid flows by purpose codes, creating a series of dependent variables appropriate for each hypothesis. We model the time-series cross-sectional nature of these dependent variables using Error Correction Models (ECM) with panel corrected standard errors. ECMs allow testing for both short- and long-term effects of the key independent variables while accounting for autoregressive processes. The results are

[11] Sectoral aid data reporting begins in 1973, limiting temporal domain. Donor reporting practices and extant democratic competition limit our sample, leaving us with 28 donors. Eastern European and others, such as Spain, enter after democratization. See donor list in Table A2.

comparable to the first difference model used by Tingley 2010, but include lagged values of the independent variables (Best 2012).[12] Specifically, our ECMs take this form: [13]

$$\Delta \boldsymbol{Y}_{k,i,t,t-1} = \boldsymbol{\alpha_0} + \boldsymbol{\alpha_1 Y}_{k,i,t-1} + \boldsymbol{\beta}\big(\Delta Internationalism_{i,t,t-1} + Internationalism_{i,t-1} + \Delta Ideology_{i,t,t-1} + Ideology_{i,t-1} + \Delta Ideology_{i,t,t-1} \times \Delta Internationalism_{i,t,t-1} + Ideology_{i,t-1} \times Internationalism_{i,t-1} + \Delta Controls_{i,t,t-1} + Controls_{i,t-1}\big) + \varepsilon_{it} \ . \quad (1)$$

In Equation 1, Y is a series of dependent variables containing the donor, *i's,* yearly total aid allocations in a sector, *k*. Each dependent variable measures aid allocations for the specified purpose in constant 2009 US$. Sectors include: Aid to Non-Status Quo (SQ) Actors, Disaster Aid, Budget Aid, Trade-factor Aid, and Economic Infrastructure Aid. We identify aid flows appropriate to each sector via AidData's purpose scheme. For Aid to Non-SQ Actors, we flag projects aimed at "Strengthening civil society", "Legal and Judicial Development", "Women in Development", and "Support to National, International, or Local and Regional Non-Governmental Organizations".[14] Disaster and humanitarian aid have their own category. Budget Aid is similarly easy to isolate as it is described directly as "General Budget Support" (code 51010). We count all "Production Sector" aid as Trade-factor Aid.[15]

[12] Donor fixed effects are an alternative. Fixed effects, however, cannot model short- and long-term effects of key variables and may create multicollinearity with government ideology variables in contexts of irregular government change. We report a donor-year fixed effects model in Table A4.

[13] The Appendix contains many robustness checks, including mixed effects with varying slopes for the donor country and cabinet levels, Seemingly Unrelated Regression models, fixed effects models, and ECMs with varying sets of controls and operationalizations of the key variables. The results largely match those presented in the text, although sometimes the primary variables drop below standard levels of significance.

[14] We flag all allocations included under purpose codes: 15130, 15150, 42010, 92010, 92020, or 92030.

[15] Production sectors include: agriculture, forestry, and fishing; industry, mining, and construction; trade policy and regulations; and tourism.

Finally, we identify aid intended to bolster economic capacity as "Economic Infrastructure and Services".[16] A logarithmic transformation of each dependent variable improves model performance.

We capture donor governments' policy preferences with the CMP (Volkens, et al. 2011), using Lowe et al.'s (2011) logged scale of parties' left-right placement to operationalize governments' broad policy goals. This measure accounts for a number of economic and social policy goals that distinguish parties' goals on the most important dimension of conflict in most advanced industrial democracies (e.g. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Budge 1993, Bakker, Jolly and Polk 2012). We interact Left-Right (RILE) Ideology with a measure of the governments' preferences for engagement with the world to assess our conditional hypotheses. Parties farther left on the main dimension of conflict have more negative scores. We operationalize the second dimension using a logged scale of the CMP's codes for internationalism.[17] Since pro-internationalism can be considered a "left" position, internationalism takes more negative values for parties that prefer international engagement. To avoid confusion in discussion below, then, we refer to this measure as *Anti*-Internationalism.

Aggregating the preferences of coalition governments and of parties in presidential systems requires some care. Strong arguments exist for and against using the political party of the executive to represent the "government's" position. Executives usually enjoy great latitude in implementing foreign policy. Coalition partners and opposition parties, though, attenuate

[16] This includes the following subsectors: transport and storage; communications; energy generation and supply; banking and financial services; business and other services.

[17] Codes per107 and per109. These categories include the percentage of quasi statements referencing the "Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for UN." Appendix 3 (Budge et al. 2001, p.4-5).

this freedom. To accommodate these concerns, we developed two versions of RILE and Anti-Internationalism. The first uses the mean coalition party or legislature position, depending on system of government.[18] The second uses the preference point of the prime minister or president.[19] In the interest of space, we relegate the second set of results to the Appendix.

<<<Figure 1 Here>>>

Figure 1 plots mean coalition RILE and Anti-internationalism. The logged scale means neither dimension has a natural center position. This plot illustrates the four party types. Leftist parties that favor and abhor entanglements with the international community exist. Likewise, some economically conservative parties advocate strongly for engagement while others do not. Only a slight tendency for right parties to be less pro-international exists, with a correlation of 0.282.

We include several controls to account for institutions, partisan arrangements and international conditions. Like Tingley (2010), we include the parliamentary strength of Christian Democrat and Social Democrats. Following Therién and Noëll's (2000) logic, we account for the range of preferences in parliament with the percentage of seats controlled by socialist, communist, and Christian democratic parties.

Other controls address governments' ability to implement policy. The effective number of cabinet parties accounts for negotiations between multiple coalition partners. A clear parliamentary majority increases the coalition's policy influence, operationalized here as cabinet's parliamentary seat share.[20]

[18] We use the majority party's position for single-party governments.

[19] Tingley (2010) also uses both. The measures of economic left-right position correlate at 0.8864; of internationalism, at 0.9015. In the rare instances of a technocratic, non-partisan prime minister, we use the largest coalition party's position.

[20] Larger coalitions may increase intra-coalition disagreement (Bevan and Greene 2016).

Countries' economic characteristics and internal conditions also influence aid allocation. We incorporate measures of economic openness to control for a link between more liberal trade preferences and aid (see McKinlay and Little 1977, Alesina and Dollar 2000, Heron 2008, Tingley 2010).[21] Domestic economic conditions constrain aid allocations (Heinrich, Kobayashi and Bryant 2016), so we include real GDP (Gleditsch 2008). Finally, we incorporate geopolitical differences caused by the Cold War with a dummy variable flagging pre-1991 observations (Bearce and Tirone 2010).

**Analysis**

We hypothesize that aid allocations depend on donor government preferences for both RILE and internationalism. The results are largely consistent with this perspective. In two cases, our expectations for RILE proved incorrect. But, in each category of aid, anti-internationalism and RILE condition each other. In three of the five models, the constitutive coefficient on Δ anti-internationalism is negative and statistically significant.

<<<Table 3 Here>>>

Table 3 presents the ECM results. Each column corresponds to the regression on the named sector. Due to the interactions between our continuous measures of ideology and internationalism, and the ECM technique, each coefficient in the tables below provides highly conditional information.[22] Coefficients for a variable's level at time *t-1* indicate long-term effects, while the change coefficients speak to short term effects. Due to the interaction, the constituent coefficients for both the lagged and change variables indicate the effect of RILE (or its change) when internationalism (or its change) equals zero. Zero's substantive meaning

[21] Following Tingley (2010) we run robustness checks controlling for trade openness. Substantive results are similar, but the substantially reduced sample size inhibits key variables' levels of significance.

[22] See Best (2012) on the ECM approach. Williams and Whitten (2012) offer additional guidance regarding interpretation.

varies across the lagged and change variables. For lagged values, it means the zero point on the dimension, which is rare for RILE.[23] For anti-internationalism, zero values are slightly more common and assigned when party manifestos provide no means of evaluating a pro- or anti-position.[24] A zero value on the change variables, however, means no shift in preferences occurred between the current and previous time-period. The appropriate interpretation of the coefficient for change in anti-internationalism, then, is the short-term effect of an increase in parochialism absent a change in RILE from the previous period. The strong pattern of significant negative effects in these coefficients, then, signals support for our argument.

<<<Table 4 Here>>>

Due to the limited information conveyed by coefficients, we graph the marginal effect, in both the short- and long-term, for each preference dimension. For a more holistic view of the results, we also designed a simulation (similar to Williams and Whitten 2012) which compares aid allocations over time. The simulation begins with an "election" in two equivalent countries A and B.[25] In both countries, elections bring in internationalist governments, two standard deviations to the left of average. Country A's new government has economic ideology scores two standard deviations to the left of the sample mean. In B, the new government's economic ideology lies two standard deviations to the right of the mean. Plugging in these values, we calculate the predicted outcome, i.e. the difference in aid allocated to each sector, for these two governments. The simulation proceeds as though these

[23] Given the logged scale, zero is not a meaningful center point.

[24] In such cases, internationalism equals ln(0+0.5) – ln(0+0.5)

[25] We use sample means for starting values for the lagged anti-internationalism and economic ideology variables, holding all other variables at mean or modal values for the simulation.

governments rule for five years.[26] We repeat the simulation moving parties to the right on internationalism for more complete interpretation.[27]

<<<Figure 2 Here>>>

Figures 2 and 3 report the marginal effects of RILE and anti-internationalism, respectively. The marginal effect gives the average increase in Y for an instantaneous increase in X, at each value of its conditioning variable. As both dimensions are conceptualized along a left-right continuum, an increase in economic ideology is a move to the right; an increase in anti-internationalism is a move away from international engagement. The thin lines in Figures 2 and 3 provide 95% confidence bands, calculated using the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers (Friedrich 1982, 810). The shaded histograms provide the in-sample distribution of the conditioning variable. Figure 4 reports the results from the simulated pro-internationalist governments with 95% confidence bounds; Figure 5, of anti-internationalist governments.

*Hypothesis 1a: Non-Status Quo Aid*

In our first hypotheses (H1a and H1b), we predict left-international governments will increase aid to disaster relief and non-status quo actors. The first panels in Figures 2 and 3 display the pertinent marginal effects.. Our model shows that, in the short-term, moving to the right associates with greater allocations of non-status quo aid *if the party also becomes more internationalist.* Further, a change towards anti-internationalism decreases such aid allocations, *only if the government also becomes more economically conservative.* These findings do not perfectly fit expectations. Our logic regarding need-based aid led us to hypothesize that pro-international leftist governments would be the ones to increase aid to

[26] Changes in the independent variables occur in the Δanti-internationalism and Δeconomic ideology variables in the first round, and lagged values of these variables in the second round. Subsequent changes in allocations stem from updated lagged dependent variables, reflecting the predicted difference from previous rounds.

[27] See appendix for simulation details.

non-status quo actors. We find instead that internationalist parties of the right boost this type of aid. Decreasing allocations to non-status quo actors when parties shift to the right on both dimensions, though, meshes with our perspective.

<<<Figure 3 Here>>>

Figure 4 plots the predicted aid allocations from our simulated election of pro-internationalist parties. The predicted effects soften results regarding this hypothesis. In the first round of our simulation, the right internationalist government significantly increased aid to non-status quo actors; the similarly internationalist, but economically liberal, government decreased the allocation. The short-term effect for the left parties, though, falls well short of statistical significance. In subsequent years, our model shows the right internationalist government reversing its allocation pattern. Within three years, subsequent cuts canceled out the first round's increase. The long-term effect for left-pro-international donors is positive, and marginally significant (at $\alpha$=10%). When the simulated election brings anti-internationalist parties to power (see Figure 5), the pattern for right governments reverses: a large decrease is offset by subsequent additions. For the left government that eschews engagement with the international community, though, predicted changes in allocation never differ significantly from zero.

*Hypothesis 1b: Disaster Assistance*

The third columns in our figures evaluate the effects on disaster aid. Short-term effects are barely significant in this regression. Natural disasters occur stochastically, but are more likely to accumulate over the course of a government's tenure than to cluster in the first year; the effect of preferences plays out over the long term. The steep slope of its marginal effects indicates that the internationalism dimension strongly conditions economic ideology's long-term effect. A more conservative government that is also internationalist allocates less money to disaster aid. On the parochial side, however, conservative governments appear more generous in this form of aid. Examining the other side of the interaction effect, we see that the

significant results pertain entirely to the leftist side of economic ideology. Consistent with H1b, the effects show that parochial leftist parties assign less of this form of aid. Figure 4's third panel contains the predicted outcomes for this model. In the long-run, a pro-internationalist left government spends more on disaster assistance while right-internationalists make no significant changes. Figure 5 shows the alternate election results, with anti-internationalist governments coming to power. Here we see the strong significant marginal effect of economic ideology playing out: on the anti-internationalist side, left and right governments behave very differently. The long-run cuts of left-anti-internationalist governments are deeper than the increased allotments by conservatives.

<<<Figure 4 Here>>>

<<<Figure 5 Here>>>

*Hypothesis 2a: Budget Support*

Our second set of hypotheses predict that conservative internationalist governments increase aid that signals backing for a government through budget support (H2a) or grows external markets for the country's goods (H2b). Contradictorily, we find that economic ideology never significantly affects allocations to budget support (see second panels in Figure 2). In the long-term, though, anti-internationalism negatively affects it if combined with leftist ideology (see Figure 3). The pattern is clearer in Figure 5. The parochial leftist government slashed budget aid after taking office, while its rightist counterpart made no significant adjustments.

We interpret this evidence as supportive of our theory, if not the specific wording of H1b. While rightist governments do not boost budget support, they also refrain from cutting it even if they become opposed to international entanglement. The long-term decrease in such aid by left-anti-internationalist governments is reasonable: budget aid is easily perceived as a potentially corrosive or unequitable means of redistributing wealth.

*Hypothesis 2b: Trade Factors and Infrastructure*

We employ two dependent variables to assess whether right-internationalist governments pursue economic advantage by bolstering new markets for their countries' exports. Results across these two regressions mirror each other quite closely, as we expected they would. For both types of aid, a shift to the right of the economic spectrum decreases allocations by moderately anti-internationalist governments in the short term, but the limited range of significance for this marginal effect raises doubts about its validity. The most similar set of effects across the two models can be seen in the long-term marginal effects of anti-internationalism. These suggest that parochialism is associated with lower aid allocations by leftist governments. The predicted effects illustrate the estimated changes in allocations over time. Pro-internationalist parties rarely differ from each other in their decisions regarding aid for trade (see Figure 4). In the trade factors model, our simulation suggests a short-term decrease in aid by far-left internationalist governments, but with very broad confidence bands. Figure 5, showing hypothetical anti-internationalists, reveals the significant effects. Here, we see significant, long-term reductions in trade-boosting aid by leftist parties.

Together, these results suggest that if a difference in preferences for these types of aid exists, it exists only for anti-internationalist governments. The inefficiency in predicted outcomes for pro-internationalist governments, though, may be due to noise in our measurement scheme. Perhaps the expected patterns of trade-boosting aid surface only in the subset of states with a history of purchasing donors' exports. Testing this more refined hypothesis requires a dyadic data structure, and thus lies outside the bounds of this analysis.

*Controls*

Many of the control variables also perform as predicted. Cabinets controlling a larger percentage of the lower house of parliament increase budget aid in the short-term, presumably due to easier policy making. This logic also explains presidentialism's negative, though

insignificant, coefficients for most sectors. Presidential systems require greater compromise due to additional institutional veto points (Tsebelis 2002). More fractionalized cabinets, those with a greater effective number of cabinet parties, only have a negative short-term effect on budget aid. Coalitions with more parties face difficulties agreeing on common foreign policy reforms, particularly in relation to aid sectors intended to influence the behavior of governments more directly. Greater left-leaning seat share (Social Democrat and Communists) has no consistent long- or short-term effect (contrasting Therién and Noëll's logic). Yet, the lack of additional effects from ideology beyond the government's is unsurprising; our more nuanced measurement of the government's position accounts for parties' ideology.

*Discussion*

Domestic political preferences and constraints affect actors' choices and capacities in international politics (Putnam 1988, Whitten and Williams 2011). Research on donor state preferences often makes overly strong simplifying assumptions, masking interesting variation both in donor preferences and in foreign aid. Considering only the left-right dimension of economic ideology lumps together governments with dissimilar goals. Despite arguments in the literature to the contrary, we contend that parties with liberal domestic preferences will not necessarily believe that excess wealth generated by their economy should be transferred to the less fortunate abroad. Similarly, governments with conservative ideology may not scorn foreign aid as a soft-hearted waste of resources. Indeed, we find that a conservative economic ideology rarely leads to reduced aid, even when combined with anti-internationalism.

Foreign aid offers a flexible tool of foreign policy. Measuring donors' "aid effort" simply by allocations as a proportion of available resources obscures the myriad purposes of economic assistance. Benevolent pursuit of economic justice is not the only motivation behind foreign aid. Because donors use aid in pursuit of many different "returns", conservative

governments interested in promoting their constituents' interests abroad find reasons to increase aid as well. Broadly, governments' ideological goals correspond to varied forms of foreign aid.

We find support for our expectations that left-right preferences condition the aid allocation patterns of regimes. Left governments give disaster aid generously, but are markedly less enthusiastic about nearly everything else. Right governments may be less sensitive to swings in the internationalism dimension, a sign that conservative governments more consistently value influence over others.

Despite earlier work's focus on left-right politics, internationalism matters. Left-anti-international governments, for example, reduce aid to the type of economic projects championed by left-pro-international parties. In the case of trade-focused aid, economic ideology manages only to blunt the stronger role of parochialism for conservative governments.

Turning to policy implications, potential recipients should tailor aid requests to the political profile of the donor governments for maximum leverage. As this logic suggests, though, politicization of aid may seriously threaten its overall development mission. Donor state policy-makers who prefer that aid focus on need and impact could benefit from built-in external commitment mechanisms, such as employing multinational or non-governmental agencies to ensure consistent, long-term funding (McGillivray and Pham 2015). Decisions regarding oversight and implementation of aid programs may also reflect changes in donor governments' preference.

More broadly, we further efforts to bridge the divide between the concepts and theories championed by comparative politics and those emphasized in international relations. The last decades brought an explosion of theory that privileges domestic politics in explaining international outcomes, yet too many models still employ extreme simplifying assumptions, boiling domestic politics down to regime-type binaries, leaders down to survival-motivations.

The perspective forwarded here takes seriously policy preferences, and variations therein, across democratic polities. In doing so, we tie electoral motivations to policy preferences, and these preferences to variation in foreign policy.

Table 1. Summary of Partisan Ideology Across Dimensions

| | RILE | |
|---|---|---|
| Internationalism | Left | Right |
| Pro | Government intervention in the economy is necessary to avoid injustice. The country should seek to engage with the international community, carrying the goal of economic justice forward. | The market is the most efficient way to foster economic well-being. The country should establish ties with the international community in order to further its interests abroad. |
| Anti | Government intervention in the economy is necessary to avoid injustice. The country should make better use of its resources, focusing on providing for its own people rather than wasting resources propping up corrupt regimes abroad. | The market is the most efficient way to foster economic well-being. The country should withdraw from entanglements abroad which erode sovereignty and cause inefficiency. |

Table 2. Summary of Theoretical Expectations

| | RILE | |
|---|---|---|
| Internationalism | Left | Right |
| Pro | Increasingly generous aid in the face of disasters.<br>Increasing aid to non-status quo actors inside recipients. | Increasing budget support.<br>Increasing allocation of aid to programs increasing recipients' viability as trade partners. |
| Anti | Decreasing allocation of aid, especially to sectors favored by the right. | Decreasing allocation of aid, especially to sectors favored by the left. |

Table 3. Summary of Findings by Hypothesis

| Hypotheses | Empirical Effect |
|---|---|
| *Left governments dedicate more aid to…* | |
| H1a) Disaster Relief | Long term |
| H1b) Non-Status Quo Groups | Contrary to expectations, short-term increase for rightist governments; marginally significant long-term increase for leftist governments. |
| *Right governments dedicate more aid to…* | |
| H2a) Budget Support | Long-term decrease for anti-internationalist left governments; no significant effect for right governments. |
| H2b) Trade Factors | Long-term decrease for anti-internationalist left-governments; no significant effect for right governments. |
| H2b) Economic Infrastructure | Long-term decrease for anti-internationalist left-governments; no significant effect for right governments. |

Table 4. ECM Regressions by Aid Sector

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Non Status Quo | Budget Support | Disaster Assistance | Trade Factors | Econ Infrastructure |
| ΔAnti-Internationalism | **-0.874*** ** | -0.396 | -0.064 | **0.670*** | -0.063 |
| | **(0.297)** | (0.592) | (0.531) | **(0.407)** | (0.455) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ | -0.285 | -0.292 | 0.250 | -0.154 | -0.201 |
| | (0.217) | (0.458) | (0.420) | (0.324) | (0.386) |
| Δ RILE | 0.016 | 0.039 | -0.022 | 0.024 | -0.011 |
| | (0.022) | (0.048) | (0.040) | (0.038) | (0.042) |
| $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | -0.010 | **0.070*** | **0.093*** ** | **0.071*** ** | **0.075** ** |
| | (0.015) | **(0.037)** | **(0.030)** | **(0.026)** | **(0.035)** |
| ΔAnti-Internationalism× ΔRILE | **-1.776*** ** | -1.010 | **-1.908*** | -1.005 | -1.611 |
| | **(0.655)** | (1.291) | **(1.081)** | (0.952) | (1.057) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ × $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | -0.127 | **0.797*** | **1.144*** ** | 0.500 | 0.528 |
| | (0.190) | **(0.479)** | **(0.384)** | (0.305) | (0.377) |
| Cold War | -0.008 | 0.021 | -0.047 | 0.070 | 0.022 |
| | (0.016) | (0.049) | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.075) |
| $\text{Real GDP}_{t-1}$ | 0.002 | 0.044** | 0.031* | 0.013 | 0.003 |
| | (0.012) | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| $\%\text{ Left Party Family Seats}_{t-1}$ | -0.003 | 0.051 | 0.047 | 0.062 | 0.080 |
| | (0.026) | (0.065) | (0.048) | (0.050) | (0.053) |
| $\%\text{ Christian Dem Seats}_{t-1}$ | -0.033 | -0.136** | 0.059 | -0.006 | 0.011 |
| | (0.033) | (0.065) | (0.061) | (0.047) | (0.053) |
| $\%\text{ Cabinet Seats}_{t-1}$ | 0.058 | 0.203 | 0.062 | 0.041 | 0.062 |
| | (0.057) | (0.139) | (0.125) | (0.118) | (0.117) |
| $\text{EN Cabinet Parties}_{t-1}$ | -0.003 | -0.009 | 0.000 | 0.006 | -0.003 |
| | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| ΔReal GDP | 0.150 | 0.086 | -0.153 | -0.147 | -0.200 |
| | (0.218) | (0.375) | (0.354) | (0.299) | (0.345) |
| Δ% Left Party Family Seats | -0.092 | 0.081 | 0.093 | 0.063 | 0.073 |
| | (0.102) | (0.236) | (0.194) | (0.164) | (0.208) |
| Δ% Christian Dem Seats | 0.029 | -0.106 | 0.505* | 0.501* | 0.479 |
| | (0.131) | (0.286) | (0.269) | (0.276) | (0.344) |
| Δ% Cabinet Seats | -0.008 | 0.502*** | 0.024 | 0.137 | 0.149 |
| | (0.082) | (0.187) | (0.164) | (0.153) | (0.159) |
| ΔEN Cabinet Parties | 0.019 | -0.057* | 0.040 | 0.013 | -0.008 |
| | (0.015) | (0.033) | (0.028) | (0.019) | (0.023) |
| Presidential System | -0.025 | -0.235 | -0.118 | -0.077 | 0.003 |
| | (0.104) | (0.149) | (0.141) | (0.117) | (0.104) |
| $\text{Aid Allocated}_{t-1}$ | -0.599*** | -0.270*** | -0.211*** | -0.114*** | -0.103*** |
| | (0.053) | (0.037) | (0.040) | (0.026) | (0.031) |
| Constant | 0.003 | -0.007 | 0.078 | 0.024 | 0.046 |
| | (0.033) | (0.075) | (0.071) | (0.067) | (0.079) |
| Observations | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 |
| R-squared | 0.321 | 0.140 | 0.111 | 0.076 | 0.063 |
| Root Mean Squared Error | 0.174 | 0.366 | 0.312 | 0.287 | 0.323 |

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Number of donors is 28.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1. Distribution of Government Preferences across Dimensions




Note: utilizes the mean coalition or legislature position.

Figure 2. Long and Short-Term Effect of Economic Ideology on Aid Allocation




Note: Marginal effect is the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of interest. Thin lines provide 95% confidence bands calculated using the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers and an assumption or Normal distribution. Shaded histograms provide in-sample distribution of the conditioning variable.

Figure 3. Long and Short-Term Effect of Economic Ideology on Aid Allocation




Note: Marginal effect is the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of interest. Thin lines provide 95% confidence bands calculated using the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers and an assumption or Normal distribution. Shaded histograms provide in-sample distribution of the conditioning variable.

Figure 4. Results from Simulation of Pro-International Election Winners




Note: Quantities charted are mean differences in allocations from simulated sampling distribution of 100,000 estimates in each sector. Vertical bars provide 95% confidence bands based on that distribution. For details of simulation procedure, please refer to text, page 20-21.

Figure 5. Results from Simulation of Anti-International Election Winners




Note: Quantities charted are mean differences in allocations from simulated sampling distribution of 100,000 estimates in each sector. Vertical bars provide 95% confidence bands based on that distribution. For details of simulation procedure, please refer to text, page 20-21.

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# Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocation:

## The role of party preferences

### Online Appendix

For review purposes and to be posted online after print publication.

**8/11/17**

## Contents

## Descriptive Statistics

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for all Included Covariates and Dependent Variables

| Variable | | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | Observations | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aid to Non-SQ Actors | overall | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.00 | 1.48 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.20 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.18 | -0.13 | 1.39 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Budget Aid | overall | 1.04 | 1.53 | 0.00 | 6.37 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 1.12 | 0.00 | 4.24 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 1.03 | -3.20 | 4.56 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Disaster Assistance | overall | 0.99 | 1.27 | 0.00 | 5.95 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.85 | 0.00 | 2.72 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.97 | -1.73 | 4.78 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Trade Factors Aid | overall | 2.01 | 1.84 | 0.00 | 6.61 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 1.67 | 0.00 | 5.23 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.88 | -3.22 | 4.61 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Econ Infrastructure Aid | overall | 2.22 | 1.99 | 0.00 | 7.16 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 1.64 | 0.00 | 5.00 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 1.25 | -2.77 | 4.99 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Economic Ideology | overall | -0.67 | 0.58 | -2.75 | 0.36 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.36 | -1.51 | -0.19 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.45 | -2.11 | 0.70 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Anti-Internationalism | overall | -0.05 | 0.05 | -0.32 | 0.08 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.03 | -0.13 | -0.01 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.04 | -0.27 | 0.07 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Real GDP | overall | 0.92 | 1.93 | 0.00 | 13.19 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 1.73 | 0.01 | 8.92 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.63 | -3.09 | 5.20 | T | = | 32 |
| % Left Seats | overall | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.69 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.59 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.12 | -0.19 | 0.60 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| % Christian Democrat Seats | overall | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.73 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.45 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.06 | -0.06 | 0.46 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| % Cabinet Seats | overall | 0.55 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.89 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.06 | 0.38 | 0.65 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.88 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| EN Cabinet Parties | overall | 1.69 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 5.48 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.78 | 1.00 | 4.04 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.44 | -0.20 | 5.37 | T-bar | = | 32 |
| Presidential System | overall | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 1.00 | N | = | 896 |
| | between | | 0.19 | 0.00 | 1.00 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | T-bar | = | 32 |

Table A2. List of Donors in Sample

| Donor | N | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| United States of America | 38 | 4.24 |
| Canada | 32 | 3.57 |
| Great Britain | 37 | 4.13 |
| Ireland | 38 | 4.24 |
| Netherlands | 38 | 4.24 |
| Belgium | 38 | 4.24 |
| Luxembourg | 38 | 4.24 |
| France | 38 | 4.24 |
| Spain | 34 | 3.79 |
| Portugal | 33 | 3.68 |
| Germany | 38 | 4.24 |
| Poland | 17 | 1.9 |
| Austria | 38 | 4.24 |
| Hungary | 17 | 1.9 |
| Slovak Republic | 13 | 1.45 |
| Italy | 35 | 3.91 |
| Greece | 37 | 4.13 |
| Estonia | 19 | 2.12 |
| Latvia | 12 | 1.34 |
| Lithuania | 7 | 0.78 |
| Finland | 38 | 4.24 |
| Sweden | 38 | 4.24 |
| Norway | 33 | 3.68 |
| Denmark | 38 | 4.24 |
| Iceland | 38 | 4.24 |
| Japan | 38 | 4.24 |
| Australia | 38 | 4.24 |
| New Zealand | 38 | 4.24 |
| Total | 896 | 100 |

## Simulation Details

The simulation procedure allows us to demonstrate the over-time effects of a shift in these dimensions, while also facilitating assessment of substantive and statistical significance. Specifically, the simulations proceed as follows:

1. Estimate an ECM model, preserving the parameter matrices.
2. Draw a vector of 100 coefficients from the multivariate Normal distribution defined by the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrices.
3. Calculate the starting value, $\widehat{Y_0}$ as $\boldsymbol{X_0}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$, using mean or modal values as appropriate for the lag and change values of controls, lagged dependent variable at in-sample average, lagged values of each preference dimension at in-sample averages, and change variables at zero.
4. Replace lagged dependent variable with $\widehat{Y_0}$.

5. Calculate the change in aid allocation enacted by each new government in the first year in office, $\widehat{Y_{r,a,1}}$, as $\boldsymbol{X}_{r,a,1}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$. Here, *r* indexes the change in economic ideology, and *a* indexes the change in anti-internationalism. The values used for *r* and *a* are reflected in the change values of the preference dimensions in this round.
6. Replace lagged dependent variable with $\widehat{Y_{r,a,1}}$.
7. Calculate the subsequent years' predicted changes, $\widehat{Y_{r,a,2}}$.. Lagged values of the preference dimensions are set to the mean + *r* and mean + *a*. Change values are set to zero.
8. Repeat steps 6 and 7 for t = 3, 4, 5, setting the lagged DV to $\widehat{Y_{r,a,t-1}}$.
9. Repeat Steps 1-8 for each dependent variable, for the following conditions:
    a. Left-Pro-Internationalist: $(r = -2\sigma, a = -2\sigma)$
    b. Right-Pro-Internationalist: $(r = +2\sigma, a = -2\sigma)$
    c. Left-Anti-Internationalist: $(r = -2\sigma, a = +2\sigma)$
    d. Right-Anti-Internationalist: $(r = +2\sigma, a = +2\sigma)$

To adequately reflect uncertainty around the predicted outcomes from our simulations, we repeat the simulation procedure 100 times, drawing a random set of 100 coefficients from the parameter matrices of the ECM regressions each time. This simulated sampling distribution of 100,000 predicted outcomes allows us to calculate 95% confidence intervals. We do so using the standard Normality assumption and associated Z-scores of 1.96.

## Operationalizing Preference Dimensions using PM or President

Our theory posits an interactive effect between two dimensions of governments' preferences: economic ideology and internationalism. The preferences of a government can be operationalized in multiple ways. Our main analysis acknowledges the potential moderating effect of coalition politics in parliamentary systems and legislative checks in presidential systems by employing the average preference position of either the coalition or of the legislature. Table A2 reports the results of an alternative strategy. In this set of Error Correction Models (ECMs), we use the party of the prime minister or president to operationalize preferences. The two means of aggregating preferences are quite similar to each other. In each dimension, the correlation across measures exceeds .89. Figure A1 demonstrates this relationship graphically. The main difference is coverage: with coalition and legislatures as the measured unit we achieve a much higher N. The loss of cases stems from technocratic and independent prime ministers.

Theoretically, we would expect this alternative measurement to be less useful than the one based on coalition and legislature means. In presidential systems, mid-term elections introduce a change in the second measure, but not the first. Similarly, if an election in a parliamentary system necessitates that the PM's party form a new coalition, one measure will move and the other will remain static. Moreover, in most donor countries the budget will be subject to legislative approval, not just executive action. Therefore, the outcome should more closely reflect mean legislative preferences than simply the executive party's positions.

Figure A1. Correlation across Measurement Strategies for Government Preferences




Note: in economic ideology r= 0.8969; in anti-internationalism, r=0.8990.

Table A2. ECM Regressions across Aid Sector using PM/President Preferences

| | (1) Non Status Quo | (2) Budget Support | (3) Disaster Assistance | (4) Trade Factors | (5) Econ Infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ΔAnti-Internationalism | -0.431 | -0.719 | -0.688 | 0.372 | -0.132 |
| | (0.312) | (0.544) | (0.462) | (0.275) | (0.266) |
| Anti-Internationalism$_{t-1}$ | -0.297 | -0.284 | 0.353 | 0.142 | 0.074 |
| | (0.238) | (0.406) | (0.338) | (0.180) | (0.191) |
| Δ RILE | -0.011 | 0.088 | 0.043 | 0.009 | 0.033 |
| | (0.029) | (0.058) | (0.042) | (0.036) | (0.033) |
| RILE $_{t-1}$ | -0.022 | 0.023 | 0.055* | 0.022 | 0.011 |
| | (0.021) | (0.046) | (0.033) | (0.027) | (0.028) |
| ΔAnti-Internationalism× Δ RILE | 0.136 | -0.420 | 0.435 | 0.677 | 0.136 |
| | (0.788) | (1.244) | (1.045) | (0.716) | (0.755) |
| Anti-Internationalism$_{t-1}$ × RILE $_{-1}$ | -0.329 | 0.496 | **0.909*** ** | **0.463*** | 0.358 |
| | (0.203) | (0.501) | **(0.345)** | **(0.239)** | (0.289) |
| Cold War | -0.014 | -0.008 | -0.099*** | 0.066*** | -0.019 |
| | (0.019) | (0.035) | (0.029) | (0.025) | (0.019) |
| Real GDP$_{t-1}$ | -0.000 | 0.000*** | 0.000** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| % Left Party Family Seats$_{t-1}$ | 0.004 | 0.044 | 0.020 | 0.054 | 0.074 |
| | (0.034) | (0.079) | (0.059) | (0.053) | (0.051) |
| % Christian Dem Seats$_{t-1}$ | -0.011 | -0.194* | 0.102 | -0.004 | 0.020 |
| | (0.057) | (0.102) | (0.092) | (0.060) | (0.055) |
| % Cabinet Seats $_{t-1}$ | 0.104 | 0.270 | 0.053 | 0.017 | 0.021 |
| | (0.072) | (0.185) | (0.153) | (0.114) | (0.105) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EN Cabinet Parties$_{t-1}$ | -0.006 | -0.011 | -0.003 | 0.006 | -0.008 |
| | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.014) |
| ΔReal GDP | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Δ% Left Party Family Seats | -0.114 | -0.182 | -0.017 | -0.049 | -0.080 |
| | (0.128) | (0.249) | (0.192) | (0.116) | (0.136) |
| Δ% Christian Dem Seats | 0.330 | -1.118* | 0.255 | 0.476 | -0.020 |
| | (0.280) | (0.592) | (0.500) | (0.470) | (0.418) |
| Δ% Cabinet Seats | 0.024 | 0.609** | -0.103 | 0.025 | 0.002 |
| | (0.121) | (0.266) | (0.216) | (0.166) | (0.151) |
| ΔEN Cabinet Parties | 0.026 | -0.085** | 0.042 | 0.009 | -0.020 |
| | (0.020) | (0.042) | (0.035) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
| Presidential System | 0.005 | -0.354*** | -0.177 | -0.284*** | -0.168*** |
| | (0.118) | (0.135) | (0.137) | (0.062) | (0.054) |
| Aid Allocated $_{t-1}$ | -0.595*** | -0.279*** | -0.217*** | -0.159*** | -0.126*** |
| | (0.065) | (0.039) | (0.032) | (0.030) | (0.024) |
| Constant | -0.004 | 0.002 | 0.145* | 0.099 | 0.142* |
| | (0.042) | (0.096) | (0.080) | (0.072) | (0.075) |
| Observations | 650 | 650 | 650 | 650 | 650 |
| Number of Donors | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| R-squared | 0.299 | 0.159 | 0.121 | 0.095 | 0.080 |
| Root Mean Squared Error | 0.202 | 0.378 | 0.293 | 0.227 | 0.223 |

Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is change in aid allocated to each sector. N in this analysis differs from main analysis due to inability to accurately assign preference measures for technocratic prime ministers in Italy. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

Given the interaction and ECM framework, it can be quite difficult to compare results using just coefficient tables. Therefore, we present marginal effects plots to mirror those in the main document. Figures A2 and A3 contain the in-sample marginal effects for economic ideology and anti-internationalism in turn. The results in both cases differ from our main analysis primarily in the short term effects. We find the largest differences in the non-status quo and economic infrastructure aid regressions. In our main analysis economic ideology and anti-internationalism both exert significant, conditional effects in the short term for these sectors. When using the prime minister or president's party preferences, we find no significant short term conditional effect for economic ideology in non-status quo and economic infrastructure aid. In both cases, the slope of effects also changes from steep negatives to very shallow positives. Comparing across regressions, economic ideology and anti-internationalism measured with the head of government's party's preference is less consistently related to aid allocation in the short term. The main analysis shows a consistently negative – though not always significant – slope in economic ideology's effect across the values of anti-internationalism. This means in the primary analysis we uncover a relatively stable short term relationship in which a shift to the right increases aid allocation when the government is more pro-internationalist. Similarly, in the main analysis anti-internationalism's effect, though varying in significance, is consistently negative on the right side of the economic spectrum, but not necessarily for leftist governments. Considering the long-term effects, one sees that this alternative measurement strategy produces similar, though slightly less efficient results compared to our main analysis.

This pattern makes sense, as the correspondence between the difference measures is considerably weaker than that between the level measures. The first differences in economic ideology across measurement strategies correlate at 0.816; in anti-internationalism, at 0 .794.

Figure A2. Results for Economic Ideology using Alternative Measure




Note: marginal effects are defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of interest. Thin bands provide 95% confidence intervals derived via the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers.

Figure A3. Results for Anti-Internationalism with Alternative Measure




Note: marginal effects are defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of interest. Thin bands provide 95% confidence intervals derived via the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers.

## Alternative OLS Specifications

We present OLS regressions using an Error Correction Model framework and panel-corrected standard errors to account for the structure of the data. This is not the only plausible specification, but it is our preferred one. Below, we provide some alternatives: ECM with clustered standard errors, OLS with country-year fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable model, and a mixed effects model. Each of these models makes different, or strictly more stringent, assumptions about the data generating process than does our preferred set of ECMs.

Table A3. ECM Regressions by Sector, OLS with Clustered Standard Errors

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Non-Status Quo Aid | Budget Support | Disaster Assistance | Trade Factors Aid | Econ Infrastructure |
| ΔAnti-Internationalism | **-0.874*** (0.267)** | -0.396 (0.574) | -0.064 (0.761) | 0.670 (0.442) | -0.063 (0.384) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ | -0.285 (0.183) | -0.292 (0.352) | 0.250 (0.334) | -0.154 (0.276) | -0.201 (0.302) |
| Δ RILE | 0.016 (0.028) | 0.039 (0.060) | -0.022 (0.037) | 0.024 (0.042) | -0.011 (0.039) |
| $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | -0.010 (0.015) | **0.070* (0.038)** | **0.093** (0.037)** | **0.071* (0.037)** | **0.075* (0.041)** |
| ΔAnti-Internationalism× Δ RILE | **-1.776*** (0.597)** | -1.010 (1.823) | -1.908 (1.860) | -1.005 (1.415) | -1.611 (2.174) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ × $\text{RILE}_{-1}$ | -0.127 (0.161) | **0.797** (0.348)** | **1.144** (0.481)** | 0.500 (0.397) | 0.528 (0.400) |
| Cold War | -0.008 (0.013) | 0.021 (0.024) | -0.047** (0.020) | 0.070*** (0.018) | 0.022 (0.015) |
| $\text{Real GDP}_{t-1}$ | 0.002 (0.016) | 0.044* (0.026) | 0.031* (0.017) | 0.013 (0.018) | 0.003 (0.014) |
| $\%\text{ Left Party Family Seats}_{t-1}$ | -0.003 (0.032) | 0.051 (0.066) | 0.047 (0.056) | 0.062 (0.043) | 0.080 (0.049) |
| $\%\text{ Christian Dem Seats}_{t-1}$ | -0.033 (0.033) | -0.136 (0.084) | 0.059 (0.067) | -0.006 (0.053) | 0.011 (0.052) |
| $\%\text{ Cabinet Seats}_{t-1}$ | 0.058 (0.076) | 0.203 (0.128) | 0.062 (0.120) | 0.041 (0.082) | 0.062 (0.115) |
| $\text{EN Cabinet Parties}_{t-1}$ | -0.003 (0.008) | -0.009 (0.017) | 0.000 (0.012) | 0.006 (0.012) | -0.003 (0.011) |
| ΔReal GDP | 0.150* (0.083) | 0.086 (0.118) | -0.153 (0.166) | -0.147 (0.143) | -0.200 (0.157) |
| Δ% Left Party Family Seats | -0.092 (0.099) | 0.081 (0.141) | 0.093 (0.142) | 0.063 (0.122) | 0.073 (0.103) |
| Δ% Christian Dem Seats | 0.029 (0.116) | -0.106 (0.288) | 0.505 (0.328) | 0.501 (0.353) | 0.479 (0.374) |
| Δ% Cabinet Seats | -0.008 (0.108) | 0.502*** (0.180) | 0.024 (0.147) | 0.137 (0.124) | 0.149 (0.145) |
| ΔEN Cabinet Parties | 0.019 (0.025) | -0.057** (0.026) | 0.040* (0.020) | 0.013 (0.022) | -0.008 (0.022) |
| Presidential System | -0.025 (0.115) | -0.235 (0.186) | -0.118 (0.107) | -0.077 (0.124) | 0.003 (0.094) |
| $\text{Aid Allocated}_{t-1}$ | -0.599*** (0.070) | -0.270*** (0.032) | -0.211*** (0.039) | -0.114*** (0.033) | -0.103*** (0.018) |
| Constant | 0.003 (0.048) | -0.007 (0.059) | 0.078 (0.062) | 0.024 (0.055) | 0.046 (0.065) |
| Observations | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 |
| R-squared | 0.321 | 0.140 | 0.111 | 0.076 | 0.063 |
| Root Mean Squared Error | 0.174 | 0.366 | 0.312 | 0.287 | 0.323 |

Note: Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on donor states.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4. OLS Regressions with Donor-Year Fixed Effects

| | (1) Non-Status Quo Aid | (2) Budget Support | (3) Disaster Assistance | (4) Trade Factors Aid | (5) Econ Infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Internationalism | **-0.531*** | -0.851 | **1.610***** | 0.189 | 0.244 |
| | **(0.286)** | (1.185) | **(0.465)** | (0.683) | (0.791) |
| RILE | -0.000 | -0.004 | 0.071 | 0.042 | -0.051 |
| | (0.026) | (0.059) | (0.089) | (0.069) | (0.072) |
| Anti-Internationalism× | -0.183 | -0.602 | **2.143**** | 0.330 | -0.021 |
| RILE | (0.325) | (0.900) | **(0.792)** | (0.789) | (0.875) |
| Cold War | -0.056** | -0.234*** | -0.391*** | 0.002 | -0.445*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.083) | (0.056) | (0.066) | (0.071) |
| Real GDP | -0.047*** | 0.016 | 0.089*** | -0.080*** | -0.071*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.051) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| % Left Party Family Seats | -0.021 | 0.295 | 0.010 | -0.064 | 0.012 |
| | (0.075) | (0.189) | (0.242) | (0.116) | (0.186) |
| % Christian Democrat Seats | -0.052 | 0.459 | -0.251 | -0.028 | -0.244 |
| | (0.070) | (0.423) | (0.382) | (0.403) | (0.492) |
| % Cabinet Seats | 0.104 | 0.954*** | 0.212 | 0.044 | 0.148 |
| | (0.113) | (0.306) | (0.261) | (0.222) | (0.257) |
| Effective Number of Cabinet Parties | -0.010 | -0.040 | 0.041 | -0.024 | 0.022 |
| | (0.017) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.039) | (0.055) |
| Constant | 0.084 | -0.055 | 0.465** | 1.000*** | 1.047*** |
| | (0.080) | (0.218) | (0.184) | (0.146) | (0.197) |
| RMSE | 0.180 | 0.423 | 0.371 | 0.347 | 0.437 |
| $R^2$ | 0.041 | 0.092 | 0.270 | 0.025 | 0.186 |
| N | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 |
| *Donors* | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |

Note: The Dependent variable is sector of aid. Fixed Effects for donor year. Robust standard errors are clustered on the country level.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

Table A5. OLS Regressions by Sector with Donor-Year Fixed Effects and Lagged Dependent Variable

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Non-Status Quo Aid | Budget Support | Disaster Assistance | Trade Factors Aid | Econ Infrastructure |
| Anti-Internationalism | **-0.455**** | -0.605 | **0.693*** | 0.070 | -0.090 |
| | **(0.193)** | (0.713) | **(0.383)** | (0.372) | (0.341) |
| RILE | -0.006 | 0.003 | 0.044 | 0.036 | 0.012 |
| | (0.017) | (0.027) | (0.052) | (0.043) | (0.054) |
| Anti-Internationalism× RILE | -0.320 | -0.284 | 0.740 | -0.093 | -0.233 |
| | (0.205) | (0.524) | (0.699) | (0.496) | (0.718) |
| Cold War | -0.043** | -0.070* | -0.156*** | 0.015 | -0.082*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.035) | (0.026) | (0.030) | (0.025) |
| Real GDP | -0.040*** | -0.002 | 0.001 | -0.050*** | -0.052*** |
| | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.010) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| % Left Party Family Seats | -0.013 | 0.095 | 0.020 | 0.036 | 0.099 |
| | (0.053) | (0.073) | (0.088) | (0.061) | (0.074) |
| % Christian Democrat Seats | -0.017 | 0.123 | 0.079 | 0.129 | 0.122 |
| | (0.054) | (0.183) | (0.167) | (0.198) | (0.197) |
| % Cabinet Seats | 0.092 | 0.446** | 0.126 | 0.095 | 0.141 |
| | (0.093) | (0.161) | (0.159) | (0.119) | (0.140) |
| Effective Number of Cabinet Parties | -0.003 | -0.026 | 0.023 | 0.004 | 0.009 |
| | (0.014) | (0.017) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.027) |
| $Aid_{t-1}$ | 0.327*** | 0.584*** | 0.634*** | 0.678*** | 0.773*** |
| | (0.085) | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.083) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.044 | -0.036 | 0.153 | 0.252 | 0.156 |
| | (0.052) | (0.108) | (0.101) | (0.154) | (0.115) |
| Observations | 908 | 908 | 908 | 908 | 908 |
| Number of Donors | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| R-squared | 0.149 | 0.380 | 0.526 | 0.386 | 0.577 |
| Root Mean Squared Error | 0.170 | 0.349 | 0.299 | 0.274 | 0.313 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Mixed Effects Regressions with Varying Country and Year Intercepts and Lagged Dependent Variable

| | (1) Non-Status Quo Aid | (2) Budget Support | (3) Disaster Assistance | (4) Trade Factors Aid | (5) Econ Infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RILE | -0.016 | 0.061$^{+}$ | 0.060$^{*}$ | 0.079$^{**}$ | 0.058 |
| | (0.012) | (0.036) | (0.030) | (0.028) | (0.037) |
| Anti-Internationalism | -0.323 | -0.474 | -0.033 | -0.102 | -0.412 |
| | (0.275) | (0.375) | (0.443) | (0.218) | (0.263) |
| Anti-Internationalism X RILE | -0.286 | 0.458 | 0.821$^{+}$ | 0.342 | 0.192 |
| | (0.199) | (0.537) | (0.498) | (0.320) | (0.434) |
| % Cabinet Seats | -0.031 | 0.248$^{*}$ | 0.001 | 0.066 | 0.066 |
| | (0.044) | (0.118) | (0.111) | (0.110) | (0.125) |
| Effective Number of Cabinet Parties | 0.008 | -0.010 | 0.012 | 0.003 | -0.003 |
| | (0.008) | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| % Left Party Family Seats | -0.010 | 0.067 | 0.032 | 0.090$^{+}$ | 0.095$^{+}$ |
| | (0.027) | (0.055) | (0.049) | (0.047) | (0.055) |
| % Christian Democrat Seats | -0.018 | -0.131$^{+}$ | 0.037 | 0.040 | 0.020 |
| | (0.032) | (0.070) | (0.060) | (0.062) | (0.069) |
| $Aid_{t-1}$ | 0.434$^{***}$ | 0.701$^{***}$ | 0.790$^{***}$ | 0.890$^{***}$ | 0.875$^{***}$ |
| | (0.068) | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Δ Real GDP | 0.028$^{**}$ | 0.079$^{***}$ | 0.048$^{*}$ | 0.018 | 0.020 |
| | (0.011) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| presidential | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) |
| Constant | 0.014 | -0.035 | 0.040 | 0.031 | 0.040 |
| | (0.031) | (0.064) | (0.060) | (0.060) | (0.068) |
| Cabinet Level | -18.762 | -20.411 | -3.710 | -26.566 | -2.897$^{***}$ |
| | (28.938) | (18.077) | (8.579) | (18.760) | (0.536) |
| Donor level | -19.160 | -22.206 | -5.792 | -26.170 | -3.021$^{***}$ |
| | (25.541) | (16.438) | (293.843) | (23.457) | (0.408) |
| Residual | -1.839$^{***}$ | -1.036$^{***}$ | -1.200$^{***}$ | -1.258$^{***}$ | -1.172$^{***}$ |
| | (0.158) | (0.121) | (0.088) | (0.071) | (0.075) |
| AIC | -704.705 | 692.229 | 413.201 | 306.506 | 500.900 |
| BIC | -642.714 | 754.220 | 475.191 | 368.496 | 562.891 |
| Log-Likelihood | 365.352 | -333.115 | -193.601 | -140.253 | -237.450 |
| *N* | 870 | 870 | 870 | 870 | 870 |

Note: The Dependent variable is sector of aid. Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{*}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.01$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.001$

## Sub-Sample Analysis by Cold War

Research on foreign aid has argued that donors' leverage over recipients in the post-Cold War era differs qualitatively from that during the era of US-Soviet competition over client states (Bearce and Tirone 2010). This possibility may mean that donors' strategic allocation of differing types of aid may vary over these time periods as well. We do not expect this to play a major role in our analysis, given the broadly insignificant findings for the Cold War dummy, though. To investigate the possible heterogeneity across eras, we estimated our models over a split population separating cases into Cold War and New World Order. Our overall sample of donor years tips towards the modern era, with just

under 60% of cases occurring after 1990. That's 534 New World Order as opposed to 362 Cold War observations. Presenting these results concisely is difficult given the complexity of our ECM approach and the multitude of dependent variables. Instead of a series of lengthy coefficient tables, then, we calculated marginal effects for our theoretical variables and present them in Figures A4 and A5. For those desiring further information, Figures A6-A10 plot all coefficients across the two time periods for each of the dependent variables.

We did not formulate nuanced ex ante expectations about the applicability of our theory across the two eras. Generally, though, we can outline a few things which we thought would likely happen when separating the samples. First, we expect that breaking the sample up should, overall, decrease the efficiency of estimates due to smaller N. Second, if anything, we would expect that variation in government ideology would matter less in an era more constrained by bipolar politics. For most regressions, splitting the sample does seem simply to decrease efficiency. In the budget aid regression, for example, all coefficients generally fall on the same side of the zero line, and point estimates for each era fall within the other's 90% confidence interval. Aid to non-status quo actors and economic infrastructure aid also feature this pattern when broken up over the two samples. The only model where point estimates seem to really significantly differ across eras is the trade factor aid equation. Here, the interaction term for short-term effects is very large, negative and significant in the Cold War sample. In the New World Order years, the interaction term falls short of significance, but is positively signed. Interestingly, this suggests that for this form of aid, the two dimensions of preferences conditioned each-other's effects more strongly during the Cold War.

Our second expectation, that models for the Cold War would indicate a smaller role for also ideology fares well. In some cases, the Cold War era effects seem to be more intense. This is particularly the case for trade factors aid, where results are very strong and significant for both economic ideology and internationalism. In three of the regressions, long-term effects for anti-internationalism appear to be more strongly conditioned by economic ideology during the Cold War than during the New World years.

Fig A4. Results for Economic Ideology in Analysis Split by Era




Note: marginal effect is defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of interest. Thin black lines and vertical grey spikes give the 95% confidence intervals derived via the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers. The histograms provide the in-sample distribution of the conditioning variables for each era. Shaded grey for the Cold War and black for the New World Order. We define Cold War as any year before 1991.

Figure A5. Results for Anti-Internationalism in Analysis Split by Era




Note: marginal effect is defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of interest. Thin black lines and vertical grey spikes give the 95% confidence intervals derived via the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers. The histograms provide the in-sample distribution of the conditioning variables for each era. Shaded grey for the Cold War and black for the New World Order. We define Cold War as any year before 1991.

Figure A6. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Non-Status Quo Aid




Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence which we accept as significant in this analysis.

Figure A7. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Budget Aid




Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence which we accept as significant in this analysis.

Figure A8. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Disaster Assistance




Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence which we accept as significant in this analysis.

Figure A9. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Trade Factor Aid




Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence which we accept as significant in this analysis.

Figure A10. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Aid




Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence which we accept as significant in this analysis.

## Alternate Measures of Ideology (RILE)

Due to the potential that the content of the RILE scale aggregates parties' goals from a range of issues, there is some concern that the left-right measure captures positions on issues that are more tangential to parties' broad left-right ideology. Scholars in other settings have removed or "purged" this measure of potentially offending issues to avoid these sorts of complications (e.g. Tavits 2007; Hellwig 2012; Williams et al. 2016). Following this approach, we create two alternate indicators of left-right policy goals. The first removes all references to international politics used in the CMP codebook. For our coalition government indicator, these measure correlates highly with the original scale (0.735). These measures should be highly correlated as differences on economic redistribution historically formed the core of the left-right dimension in most western democracies (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1960). The second measure purges all "non-economic" content, creating a measure that only reports parties' positions on the most well-known aspects of the left-right dimension. This also correlates closely with the original RILE (0.894). We then perform our analysis using these indicators. Unsurprisingly then, the results closely mirror those presented in the main analysis, although with losses in efficiency.

We present the predicted effects from this analysis in Figure A11-A14. The results for the international-purged measure closely match those found in the main analysis. The primary exception is that the reduced variance on the RILE measure means the coefficients have slightly smaller values. The confidence intervals have slightly greater overlap as well. However, these results suggest that the effect of parties' positions on the most important dimension of conflict is not driven solely by their left-right positions on topics related to foreign policy.

Similar patterns hold, as well, for the economic-purged RILE score. This measure, though, as it excludes a broader array of content, is considerably less efficient than either the original or the international-purged RILE measures.

Table A7. ECM Regressions by Sector with the International-Purged version of RILE.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Non-SQ | Budget Support | Disaster Assistance | Trade Factors | Econ Infrastructure |
| Δ Anti-Internationalism | -0.736** | -0.303 | -0.140 | 0.768+ | -0.018 |
| | (0.284) | (0.579) | (0.518) | (0.412) | (0.465) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ | -0.210 | -0.769* | -0.487 | -0.379 | -0.471 |
| | (0.159) | (0.359) | (0.327) | (0.247) | (0.314) |
| Δ RILE | 0.009 | 0.027 | 0.036 | 0.002 | -0.005 |
| | (0.023) | (0.054) | (0.044) | (0.042) | (0.048) |
| $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | 0.016 | 0.095* | 0.141*** | 0.106** | 0.100** |
| | (0.021) | (0.044) | (0.037) | (0.032) | (0.038) |
| Δ Anti-Internationalism X Δ RILE | -1.595** | 0.290 | -1.500 | -0.813 | -1.744+ |
| | (0.555) | (1.156) | (0.983) | (0.808) | (0.934) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ X $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | 0.269 | 0.663 | 0.958* | 1.002* | 0.735 |
| | (0.304) | (0.629) | (0.465) | (0.422) | (0.476) |
| Cold War | -0.011 | 0.031 | -0.036 | 0.085 | 0.036 |
| | (0.016) | (0.048) | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.074) |
| Δ Real GDP | 0.145 | 0.029 | -0.269 | -0.147 | -0.230 |
| | (0.219) | (0.369) | (0.348) | (0.293) | (0.341) |
| Δ % Left Party Family Seats | -0.089 | 0.076 | 0.154 | 0.046 | 0.092 |
| | (0.101) | (0.232) | (0.193) | (0.164) | (0.208) |
| Δ % Christian Dem Seats | 0.090 | -0.081 | 0.527* | 0.522+ | 0.497 |
| | (0.130) | (0.281) | (0.265) | (0.270) | (0.337) |
| Δ % Cabinet Seats | -0.009 | 0.515** | 0.032 | 0.132 | 0.135 |
| | (0.083) | (0.189) | (0.168) | (0.155) | (0.163) |
| Δ EN Cabinet Parties | 0.022 | -0.058+ | 0.038 | 0.015 | -0.006 |
| | (0.015) | (0.033) | (0.029) | (0.020) | (0.024) |
| $\text{Real GDP}_{t-1}$ | 0.003 | 0.037+ | 0.022 | 0.014 | 0.002 |
| | (0.012) | (0.021) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| $\text{\% Left Party Family Seats}_{t-1}$ | 0.003 | 0.068 | 0.074 | 0.064 | 0.082 |
| | (0.025) | (0.065) | (0.048) | (0.050) | (0.054) |
| $\text{\% Christian Dem Seats}_{t-1}$ | -0.019 | -0.146* | 0.055 | -0.017 | -0.002 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.034) | (0.061) | (0.059) | (0.044) | (0.050) |
| % Cabinet Seats$_{t-1}$ | 0.067 | 0.211 | 0.075 | 0.039 | 0.063 |
| | (0.056) | (0.140) | (0.126) | (0.119) | (0.119) |
| EN Cabinet Parties$_{t-1}$ | -0.003 | -0.010 | -0.003 | 0.006 | -0.004 |
| | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| Presidential System | -0.021 | -0.187 | -0.059 | -0.071 | 0.012 |
| | (0.104) | (0.143) | (0.136) | (0.104) | (0.092) |
| Aid$_{t-1}$ | -0.598*** | -0.271*** | -0.213*** | -0.117*** | -0.105*** |
| | (0.053) | (0.037) | (0.039) | (0.026) | (0.031) |
| Constant | -0.001 | -0.050 | 0.023 | -0.019 | 0.003 |
| | (0.033) | (0.075) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.077) |
| RMSE | 0.174 | 0.365 | 0.311 | 0.287 | 0.323 |
| X2 | 150.001 | 71.489 | 49.622 | 40.840 | 27.966 |
| *N* | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 |

Figure A11. Pro-Internationalist - Purged Left-Right positions



Figure A12. Anti-Internationalist – Purged Left-Right positions



Table A8. ECM Regressions by Sector with the Only Economic, Purged Version of RILE

| | (1) Non-SQ | (2) Budget Support | (3) Disaster Assistance | (4) Trade Factors | (5) Econ Infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Δ Anti-Internationalism | -0.736** | -0.229 | 0.011 | 0.842* | 0.112 |
| | (0.283) | (0.586) | (0.520) | (0.425) | (0.483) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ | -0.210 | -0.802* | -0.365 | -0.386 | -0.410 |
| | (0.156) | (0.356) | (0.328) | (0.250) | (0.316) |
| Δ RILE | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.014 | -0.014 | -0.037 |
| | (0.025) | (0.057) | (0.047) | (0.045) | (0.052) |
| $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | 0.001 | 0.087+ | 0.079+ | 0.065+ | 0.065 |
| | (0.025) | (0.052) | (0.045) | (0.036) | (0.041) |
| Δ Anti-Internationalism X Δ RILE | -1.389+ | 1.814 | 1.335 | 0.032 | 0.145 |
| | (0.777) | (1.359) | (1.242) | (1.049) | (1.187) |
| $\text{Anti-Internationalism}_{t-1}$ X $\text{RILE}_{t-1}$ | -0.028 | 0.603 | -0.416 | 0.258 | -0.123 |
| | (0.359) | (0.821) | (0.667) | (0.535) | (0.626) |
| Cold War | -0.008 | 0.036 | -0.021 | 0.091 | 0.046 |
| | (0.016) | (0.048) | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.074) |
| Δ Real GDP | 0.106 | 0.083 | -0.248 | -0.146 | -0.222 |
| | (0.222) | (0.377) | (0.352) | (0.300) | (0.344) |
| Δ % Left Party Family Seats | -0.077 | 0.079 | 0.157 | 0.057 | 0.081 |
| | (0.102) | (0.234) | (0.195) | (0.167) | (0.212) |
| Δ % Christian Dem Seats | 0.079 | -0.115 | 0.467+ | 0.494+ | 0.499 |
| | (0.138) | (0.285) | (0.269) | (0.270) | (0.339) |
| Δ % Cabinet Seats | 0.003 | 0.496** | 0.022 | 0.120 | 0.129 |
| | (0.082) | (0.188) | (0.166) | (0.154) | (0.163) |
| Δ EN Cabinet Parties | 0.020 | -0.057+ | 0.034 | 0.013 | -0.010 |
| | (0.015) | (0.033) | (0.028) | (0.019) | (0.023) |
| $\text{Real GDP}_{t-1}$ | 0.003 | 0.038+ | 0.022 | 0.013 | 0.002 |
| | (0.012) | (0.020) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.014) |
| % Left Party Family $\text{Seats}_{t-1}$ | 0.004 | 0.068 | 0.072 | 0.062 | 0.085 |
| | (0.026) | (0.064) | (0.048) | (0.050) | (0.055) |
| $\%\text{ Christian Dem Seats}_{t-1}$ | -0.026 | -0.163** | 0.011 | -0.043 | -0.033 |
| | (0.032) | (0.059) | (0.056) | (0.043) | (0.049) |
| $\%\text{ Cabinet Seats}_{t-1}$ | 0.058 | 0.201 | 0.059 | 0.030 | 0.053 |
| | (0.056) | (0.139) | (0.125) | (0.118) | (0.118) |
| $\text{EN Cabinet Parties}_{t-1}$ | -0.002 | -0.005 | 0.003 | 0.010 | 0.001 |
| | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| Presidential System | -0.015 | -0.203 | -0.049 | -0.072 | 0.017 |
| | (0.103) | (0.142) | (0.137) | (0.105) | (0.092) |
| $\text{Aid}_{t-1}$ | -0.600*** | -0.270*** | -0.208*** | -0.112*** | -0.103*** |
| | (0.053) | (0.037) | (0.039) | (0.026) | (0.031) |
| Constant | 0.002 | -0.068 | 0.004 | -0.031 | -0.014 |
| | (0.035) | (0.078) | (0.070) | (0.069) | (0.080) |
| RMSE | 0.175 | 0.365 | 0.311 | 0.288 | 0.323 |
| X2 | 143.708 | 69.917 | 47.627 | 36.620 | 29.777 |
| *N* | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 |

Figure A13. Pro-Internationalist Governments, Only Economic RILE




Figure A14. Anti-Internationalist Governments, Only Economic RILE



## Seemingly Unrelated Error Correction Model

Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) following an Error Correction Framework offers an alternate modeling choice to the panel corrected standard errors we use in the main analysis. SUR models allow for the errors to correlate between multiple dependent variables in compositional data. Although we argue that aid budgets are likely not determined in mass, but individually based on the goals of the government, a SUR approach might account for any correlation in the errors if aid budgets are decided as a fixed sum and then each aid category were decided as proportions (i.e. Aid is allocated from a 'fixed pie'; Philips, Rutherford and Whitten 2016). In such circumstances, a change in one spending category may constitute an un-modeled influence on the other categories. A SUR framework accommodates this data structure by allowing the error terms across regressions to correlate, essentially acknowledging that factors which lurk in the error terms across dependent variables may move together.

Following this perspective, we run the analysis (Table A9) using a SUR ECM framework. The results reveal similar patterns, but with smaller confidence intervals. As graphically demonstrated in Figure A14, the basic results match those from our key findings. Aid to Non-SQ groups and Disaster Aid reveal long term positive effects from left international governments. These effects reverse for anti-international left governments (Figure A15). Like our main analysis, the predicted effects of pro-international right governments overlap with zero for Budget, Trade factors and Economic infrastructure aid.

These models provide some additional useful information that help to explain the difference between these results and those from a more standard ECM approach. Intriguingly, the results suggest mixed levels of correlation in the residuals. Analysis of the residuals reveals that the Trade Factors and Economic Infrastructure are the most highly correlated aid types and the residuals for Budget Aid and Disaster Aid correlates with these models as well. Aid to Non-Status quo groups is the most independent model. These cross-model correlations may explain the somewhat different evidence for the Trade Factors and Economic Infrastructure Aid types.

Yet, if the distribution of funds to aid categories is determined somewhat independently, then an exogenous common process such as preferences that lead to changes in aid may lead to surprising relates if the dependent variables are not compositional in nature. Given the reduction in standard errors in the SUR ECMs, we believe that the ECMs with panel corrected standard errors presented in the text are a more difficult test of the theory and better reflect the proposed theoretical mechanism.

Table A9. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates

| | Non-SQ Groups | Budget Support | Disaster Assistance | Trade Factors | Econ Infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Δ Anti-Internationalism | -0.879*** | -1.265 | -0.609 | 1.366 | -0.857 |
| | (0.256) | (1.200) | (1.011) | (1.039) | (1.258) |
| Anti-Internationalism$_{t-1}$ | -0.293 | -0.957 | 1.027 | -0.949 | -0.912 |
| | (0.190) | (0.886) | (0.743) | (0.765) | (0.925) |
| Δ RILE | 0.015 | 0.085 | -0.063 | 0.019 | -0.082 |
| | (0.022) | (0.103) | (0.086) | (0.089) | (0.107) |
| RILE$_{t-1}$ | -0.011 | 0.157+ | 0.237*** | 0.203** | 0.259** |
| | (0.018) | (0.083) | (0.070) | (0.072) | (0.087) |
| Δ Anti-Internationalism | -1.769*** | -3.262 | -4.541* | -3.439 | -5.719* |
| X Δ RILE | (0.521) | (2.442) | (2.053) | (2.105) | (2.555) |
| Anti-Internationalism$_{t-1}$ | -0.131 | 1.605 | 3.480*** | 1.609+ | 2.483* |
| X RILE$_{t-1}$ | (0.216) | (1.014) | (0.873) | (0.880) | (1.068) |
| Cold War | -0.008 | 0.055 | -0.149** | 0.299*** | -0.027 |
| | (0.013) | (0.062) | (0.053) | (0.056) | (0.065) |
| Δ Real GDP | 0.152 | 0.133 | -0.522 | -0.082 | -0.412 |
| | (0.115) | (0.537) | (0.452) | (0.465) | (0.563) |
| Δ % Left Party Family | -0.092 | 0.049 | 0.328 | 0.003 | 0.038 |
| Seats | (0.097) | (0.455) | (0.383) | (0.393) | (0.477) |
| Δ % Christian Dem | 0.030 | -0.246 | 1.252+ | 0.949 | 1.436 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seats | (0.185) | (0.869) | (0.730) | (0.749) | (0.909) |
| Δ % Cabinet Seats | -0.008 | 1.187** | 0.073 | 0.176 | 0.234 |
| | (0.096) | (0.449) | (0.377) | (0.387) | (0.470) |
| Δ EN Cabinet Parties | 0.019 | -0.137+ | 0.089 | 0.042 | -0.001 |
| | (0.016) | (0.073) | (0.061) | (0.063) | (0.076) |
| Real $GDP_{t-1}$ | 0.002 | 0.099** | 0.128*** | 0.126*** | 0.131*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.035) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.038) |
| % Left Party Family $Seats_{t-1}$ | -0.003 | 0.132 | 0.163 | 0.162 | 0.356* |
| | (0.030) | (0.140) | (0.117) | (0.120) | (0.147) |
| % Christian Dem $Seats_{t-1}$ | -0.034 | -0.355* | 0.160 | -0.111 | -0.049 |
| | (0.037) | (0.176) | (0.147) | (0.151) | (0.183) |
| % Cabinet $Seats_{t-1}$ | 0.058 | 0.592+ | 0.090 | -0.053 | 0.040 |
| | (0.070) | (0.332) | (0.276) | (0.285) | (0.345) |
| EN Cabinet $Parties_{t-1}$ | -0.003 | -0.039 | 0.008 | 0.021 | -0.016 |
| | (0.008) | (0.036) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.038) |
| Presidential System | -0.026 | -0.306 | -0.522* | -0.778** | -0.716* |
| | (0.062) | (0.291) | (0.252) | (0.265) | (0.317) |
| $Aid_{t-1}$ | -0.609*** | -0.278*** | -0.281*** | -0.198*** | -0.219*** |
| | (0.030) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.016) |
| Constant | 0.003 | -0.081 | 0.195 | 0.159 | 0.351+ |
| | (0.040) | (0.188) | (0.158) | (0.163) | (0.199) |
| AIC | 6850.619 | | | | |
| BIC | 7330.413 | | | | |
| Root Mean Squared Error | 0.172 | 0.808 | 0.680 | 0.705 | 0.857 |
| $\chi^2$ | 445.535 | 189.604 | 205.966 | 206.993 | 218.616 |
| Log-Likelihood | -3325.309 | | | | |
| *N* | 896 | | | | |

Figure A15. Pro-Internationalist Governments, SUR results




Figure A 16. Anti-Internationalist Governments, SUR results



## Error Correction Models with Country Fixed Effects

Despite the logic expressed above, regarding the wisdom of combining ECM and country fixed effects, we present a combination model below. As we would expect given that much of the variance in our outcome variable occurs within rather than across units, and our quite comprehensive slate of substantive controls, incorporating country dummies introduces considerable multicollinearity, without explaining much more variance in the outcome. The result is inflated standard errors, but little to no change in the coefficient estimates.

Table A10. Error Correction with Country Fixed Effects

| | (1) Non-SQ | (2) Budget Support | (3) Disaster Assistance | (4) Trade Factors | (5) Econ Infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Δ Anti-Internationalism | -0.935** | -0.291 | 0.127 | 0.652 | 0.011 |
| | (0.299) | (0.607) | (0.524) | (0.417) | (0.468) |
| Anti-Internationalism$_{t-1}$ | -0.264 | -0.401 | 0.809+ | -0.061 | -0.053 |
| | (0.247) | (0.517) | (0.474) | (0.380) | (0.460) |
| Δ RILE | 0.019 | 0.028 | -0.033 | 0.023 | -0.012 |
| | (0.022) | (0.049) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.043) |
| RILE$_{t-1}$ | 0.002 | 0.031 | 0.075* | 0.060+ | 0.055 |
| | (0.018) | (0.047) | (0.036) | (0.032) | (0.040) |
| Δ Anti-Internationalism X Δ RILE | -1.863** | -1.043 | -1.874+ | -0.782 | -1.422 |
| | (0.645) | (1.269) | (1.054) | (0.939) | (1.059) |
| Anti-Internationalism$_{t-1}$ X RILE$_{t-1}$ | -0.102 | 0.347 | 1.066* | 0.141 | 0.203 |
| | (0.248) | (0.561) | (0.455) | (0.370) | (0.455) |
| Cold War | -0.042* | -0.064 | -0.155* | 0.021 | -0.082 |
| | (0.019) | (0.052) | (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.085) |
| Δ Real GDP | 0.053 | -0.009 | -0.222 | -0.307 | -0.348 |
| | (0.215) | (0.391) | (0.355) | (0.297) | (0.345) |
| Δ % Left Party Family Seats | -0.096 | 0.062 | 0.057 | 0.023 | 0.063 |
| | (0.106) | (0.229) | (0.195) | (0.167) | (0.210) |
| Δ % Christian Dem Seats | 0.054 | -0.007 | 0.414 | 0.494+ | 0.450 |
| | (0.135) | (0.285) | (0.268) | (0.277) | (0.343) |
| Δ % Cabinet Seats | 0.037 | 0.568** | 0.074 | 0.130 | 0.160 |
| | (0.085) | (0.188) | (0.164) | (0.153) | (0.165) |
| Δ EN Cabinet Parties | 0.011 | -0.060 | 0.041 | 0.005 | -0.001 |
| | (0.017) | (0.036) | (0.030) | (0.021) | (0.026) |
| Real GDP$_{t-1}$ | -0.038* | 0.005 | 0.005 | -0.046* | -0.048+ |
| | (0.019) | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.026) |
| % Left Party Family Seats$_{t-1}$ | -0.021 | 0.117 | 0.008 | 0.063 | 0.128 |
| | (0.057) | (0.095) | (0.091) | (0.067) | (0.089) |
| % Christian Dem Seats$_{t-1}$ | -0.078 | 0.149 | -0.020 | 0.037 | 0.036 |
| | (0.125) | (0.229) | (0.194) | (0.181) | (0.203) |
| % Cabinet Seats$_{t-1}$ | 0.129 | 0.371* | 0.168 | 0.073 | 0.136 |
| | (0.081) | (0.170) | (0.146) | (0.149) | (0.154) |
| EN Cabinet Parties$_{t-1}$ | -0.012 | -0.004 | 0.021 | 0.007 | 0.021 |
| | (0.014) | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
| Presidential System | 0.293 | 0.290 | 0.342 | 0.821*** | 0.658* |
| | (0.183) | (0.300) | (0.240) | (0.232) | (0.270) |
| Aid$_{t-1}$ | -0.668*** | -0.415*** | -0.363*** | -0.319*** | -0.227*** |
| | (0.054) | (0.049) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.063) |
| Country Fixed Effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | 0.059 | -0.064 | 0.075 | 0.056 | 0.062 |
| | (0.053) | (0.102) | (0.092) | (0.095) | (0.114) |
| RMSE | 0.172 | 0.357 | 0.304 | 0.280 | 0.320 |
| X2 | 214.487 | 132.410 | 82.821 | 66.146 | 57.900 |
| *N* | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 | 896 |

Figure A 17. Pro-Internationalist Governments, ECM with donor country fixed effects.




Figure A 18. Anti-Internationalist Governments, ECM with donor country fixed effects.



## Panel-Summarized Descriptive Statistics

Table A11. Descriptive Statistics across and within Panels

| Variable | | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | Observations | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aid to Non-SQ Actors | overall | 0.0885 | 0.2973 | 0.0000 | 3.4111 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 0.0904 | 0.0000 | 0.3075 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.2835 | -0.2190 | 3.2367 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Budget Support | overall | 0.9875 | 1.5013 | 0.0000 | 6.3670 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 1.1186 | 0.0000 | 4.2402 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 1.0046 | -3.2527 | 4.4742 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Disaster Aid | overall | 0.9339 | 1.2545 | 0.0000 | 5.9537 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 0.8369 | 0.0000 | 2.6481 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.9516 | -1.7142 | 4.7486 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Trade Factors | overall | 1.9127 | 1.8388 | 0.0000 | 6.6148 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 1.6631 | 0.0007 | 5.2346 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.8742 | -3.3219 | 4.5684 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Econ. Infrastructure | overall | 2.1018 | 1.9877 | 0.0000 | 7.1625 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 1.6280 | 0.0000 | 4.9544 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 1.2311 | -2.8527 | 4.8927 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Anti-Internationalism, Prime Minister | overall | -0.0490 | 0.0538 | -0.3184 | 0.1257 | N | = | 927 |
| | between | | 0.0315 | -0.1403 | -0.0088 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.0432 | -0.2776 | 0.1145 | T-bar | = | 33 |
| Anti-Internationalism, Coalition | overall | -0.0506 | 0.0494 | -0.3191 | 0.2134 | N | = | 937 |
| | between | | 0.0311 | -0.1264 | -0.0104 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.0377 | -0.2689 | 0.1989 | T-bar | = | 33 |
| RILE, prime minister | overall | -0.2081 | 0.4743 | -1.5073 | 0.9465 | N | = | 923 |
| | between | | 0.2829 | -0.9209 | 0.3171 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.3839 | -1.5041 | 1.0737 | T-bar | = | 33 |
| RILE, coalition | overall | -0.2345 | 0.4476 | -1.4937 | 0.9465 | N | = | 933 |
| | between | | 0.2608 | -0.9429 | 0.1931 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.3663 | -1.4615 | 0.9503 | T-bar | = | 33 |
| Real GDP (millions 2009 US$) | overall | 1310.0 | 2240.0 | 5.2235 | 14400.0 | N | = | 687 |
| | between | | 1870.0 | 7.3602 | 9420.0 | n | = | 27 |
| | within | | 764.0 | -2730.0 | 6300.0 | T | = | 25 |
| Left % Seats | overall | 0.2539 | 0.2269 | 0.0000 | 0.7848 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 0.1926 | 0.0000 | 0.5865 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.1268 | -0.1847 | 0.9273 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Christian Dem % Seats | overall | 0.1335 | 0.1673 | 0.0000 | 0.7333 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 0.1555 | 0.0000 | 0.4601 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.0570 | -0.0599 | 0.4834 | T-bar | = | 35 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabinet % Seats | overall | 0.5511 | 0.1074 | 0.0000 | 0.9500 | N | = | 981 |
| | between | | 0.0638 | 0.3709 | 0.6543 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.0852 | 0.0459 | 0.9339 | T-bar | = | 35 |
| Effective Number of Cabinet Parties | overall | 1.7023 | 0.8750 | 1.0000 | 5.4814 | N | = | 978 |
| | between | | 0.7235 | 1.0000 | 4.0295 | n | = | 28 |
| | within | | 0.4992 | -0.1321 | 5.3931 | T-bar | = | 35 |